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Vice-Rector Professor
Vervenne
welcomed the participants to the one-day workshop on 19 September 2002
on "Fundamental issues of European space policy", organized
by the university's Institute of International Law and Systemics Network
International. He introduced the Workshop on behalf of the two organizers
and of the University.
Europe in space is
at an historic turning point. The ESA system and its progeny, like Eutelsat
and Arianespace, have dominated the past. But, now, the EU aims at making
space an integral part of its core policies. How, he asked, will it do
so? How "integral" will the EU's approach to space be? Think
of the enormous new applications we could have. But will these be only
for civil space activities, or also for the EU's developing Common Foreign,
Security and Defence Policy? Where will ESA stand in the new European
architecture? Will there still be "two Europes in one space",
or will we see increasing interpenetration? Beyond these questions, how
should space science, technology and R&D projects develop in the European
context if we are to meet the challenges?
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How
does this fit in with the future of the aerospace industry?
The European Space
Policy Workshop series has been launched to enter these and other questions.
It has been timed to accompany and complement institutional policy deliberations
at a time of major realignment in inter-institutional relationships. The
outcome of this process will strongly affect Europe's profile in the space
field for the next decades. It will be of decisive importance for our
common future.
But why should a university
like K.U.Leuven take the initiative? It is not just because it is the
oldest university in Northern Europe or because it enjoys international
prestige in space-related science and technology. Nor is it because the
Faculty of Law has an international reputation for matters related to
European and international organizations-to which it has now added space
law and policy. Rather, it is because it is this University's strong conviction
that it owes more to society than teaching and research. It has a crucial
third function, in light of its ancient tradition of international and
European openness-to make itself available for the European and international
community, to bring important challenges of public interest to the fore,
to discuss them in all objectivity and academic rigour, and to assist
in finding responses to these challenges.
K.U.Leuven, in other
words, sees itself as an "honest broker" in this broad debate
on Europe and its space policy. An academic institution of high standing
in European affairs is ideally placed to fulfil such a role, while an
independent consultancy specialized in this field, Systemics Network International,
can provide as partner the requisite practical, informational and logistical
basis. It is for these reasons that KU Leuven and SNI have joined forces
as the workshop series' organizers.
Prof. Vervenne closed
by expressing his high hopes for the free, yet structured exchange the
select Workshops are designed to allow.
Next, Madame Marie-Claude
Limbourg spoke in the name of Mr Ylieff, the Commissioner in the Belgian
Government responsible for Science Policy.
Belgium is fourth
in Europe for investing in European space through ESA; 90% of national
space funding goes through the Agency. She recalled Belgium's contribution
to policy development in recent years, notably Mr Ylieff's role in this
regard when he was Chairman of the ESA Council at ministerial level. She
also commented on some of the challenges facing Belgium, and other European
nations, in orienting themselves towards the future. Different ways were
being found at programme level to deal with some of these challenges.
But a joint European strategy, she added, is needed on several grounds-to
avoid scientific and industrial domination, to address applications that
will have an impact on Europe's citizens, and to bring together national
and European programmes. She and the Commissioner therefore wished the
workshop well.
Following this Statement,
Frances Brown, Editor of Space Policy and the Workshop Chair, introduced
the Workshop's first session and its working tools, as contained in the
Workshop Folder.
Dr
Kevin Madders,
Managing Partner of Systemics Network International and Workshop co-organizer,
made the first presentation, "Background: Highlights of how today's
system for space in Europe arose".
Starting with a snapshot
of today's European space "system", this reveals a number of
actors and levels, but no unified design. To help understand the way this
disparate system was defined, he referred to four basic factors its organizing
entities depend upon: drivers, scope, mechanisms and resources. He then
related these factors to a scorecard for policy content by which the completeness
of the various systems could be judged. He next presented a model statement
of space policymaking. Some words were familiar from recent EU and ESA
output. Yet the statement came from 1958, when Senator Johnson's committee
fashioned the policy that set the United States on the path to becoming
the undisputed dominant space power it is today.
It was the comprehensiveness
of the Johnson formula in creating a policy framework that set a standard
too for the first European systems. As Dr Madders went through them, their
scorecards revealed what a roller-coaster ride space policy system building
in Europe had been, from 1960 right up to the present, still fragmented
scene.
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Prof. Johnson-Freese
started by outlining the main current drivers in setting US goals for
space. These are national security, and otherwise pragmatism, economic
stringency, prestige, and science. Space is one of the few industries
that cannot be privatised in the foreseeable future. Therefore, there
is a tendency to base funding on what in politics can produce political
will rather than on profit potential.
The US has made its
military space efforts an increasingly high national priority. Missile
Defence is now part of these efforts, which witness a growing synergy
between the space domain and strategic capabilities. Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld has articulated in six "transformational goals"
the sweeping doctrine that now holds sway. One is "to maintain unhindered
access to space and protect our space capabilities from enemy attack".
He had earlier warned of a "Space Pearl Harbor", which laid
a justification for moving from a policy of deterrence and defence against
"probable" attack to preparedness for any "possible"
attack.
In practical terms
the US' main military space focus is on: Space Support (activities such
as launching, deploying space vehicles, maintaining and sustaining them
on orbit, and their recovery), Force Enhancement (a capability that significantly
increases the combat potential of a force), Space Control (operations
which provide freedom of action in space, and include surveillance, denial
to adversaries, and protection), and Force Application (in other words,
weaponisation of space).
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Part of the technological
expression of this policy is the creation of integrated Global Utilities
and of support systems such as the project for the MS-1A Military Spaceplane
System Architecture. Following 9/11 manned reusable transportation systems
that were mere paper designs have moved closer towards the realm of reality.
Financial constraints have been relaxed massively.
For Europe, the technology
gap that has already emerged is so vast that it may be idle to think of
trying to catch up. As the magazine Wired boasted in April 2002, "The
Race to Dominate Space is over. We Won".
Turning to Europe
in its global context, Prof. Johnson-Freese observed a number of system
features. Firstly, as in the US and elsewhere, space has been a topic
of interest to many, a priority for a few, and the full responsibility
of none. But in Europe the situation seems significantly exacerbated by
the number of national players, and the increasing number of organizations
representing the multiple players. There seems to be a real problem in
setting and assessing goals. She recalled in this regard the political
drivers for space funding and compared Japan's Information Gathering Satellite
(IGS) System and Britain's TopSat as examples of obedience to factors
that were not function-driven. Topsat was, certainly, low-cost, but added
dubious value to commercially available imagery.
Prof. Johnson-Freese
mentioned that it has always been difficult for Americans to deal with
Europe as there is no single entity for European space policy. No one
therefore knows who's in charge. She commented that it might be easier
for Europe as well to address space policy issues if all decision-making
were centralised. She also noted a frustration felt by US players in their
dialogue with Europe at the gap between rhetoric and action. The perception
was that Europe was quite ready to complain at US actions, but unable
to come up with its own proposals. She felt there is a willingness on
the US' part to ensure more productive cooperation. But it must show a
programmatic gain. In this regard, and with regard to its own programmes,
Europe should not underestimate the funding that is needed. Europe may
not like dependency, but it has to confront the choice of dependency versus
spending lots of money. And while it is of course right for ESA to compare
itself with NASA in examining its programme composition, Europe should
also assess carefully the differences between NASA and ESA. NASA has a
legacy, which it lives from, that ESA has not. Building such a legacy
is part of Europe's political challenge for the future.
Mr Jean-Pol Poncelet,
ESA Director of Strategy and External Relations, speaking on "Issues
of Purpose and Opportunities for Europe in Space", referred to the
many achievements of ESA. Looking forward, he foresaw a situation where
there would still be two players-ESA and the EU-but one policy for both.
Some of the tasks of policy have already been indicated in European Commission
President Romano Prodi's "Four Challenges" European Convention
speech. These include creating European identity, assisting in achieving
a balanced model of society, enhancing freedom and security, and making
Europe a centre of intellectual and scientific influence and innovation.
The EU Barcelona Summit moreover added the goal of raising European investments
in research to GDP 3% by 2010, from 1.93% now.
The co-existence of
ESA and EU does hinder the decision-making process due to the major structural
and legal differences between ESA and the EU. There is some duplication
of authority, as there is no clear division of responsibilities. Despite
this, both organizations have been able to agree in principle on the goals
Europe ought to pursue in space, against a backcloth of a European space
industry facing poor economic prospects. In addition to existing programmes,
space should contribute to a Common Defence and Security Policy; Galileo,
a joint programme, should go ahead and serve as a test-case for future
cooperation; and Europe should aim with GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment
and Security) to take leadership in improving environmental security.
All realize, furthermore, that space tools offer Europe the opportunity
to exercise greater influence in the world.
The organizational
challenge is to find the equilibrium necessary for an efficient, cost-effective
and politically sustainable alliance between the institutions.
Yet, it must be asked
in this regard: Who do we talk to? And to what degree will the EU participate
in space-policy making, and by what means? If EU models are to be followed,
how, then, can ESA's geographical return system-so fundamental to its
system-be accommodated? In answering these and other questions it will
be important to make sure that the equilibrium to be found fully takes
account of the gains Europe has made through ESA, not least in programme
management and efficiency.
Mr Luc Tytgat,
Head of the Space Policy and Coordination of Research Unit in DG Research
of the European Commission, followed on with "The process of building
space policy in the EU". Portraying the EU structure and its three
"pillars", he noted how the overarching policies of the Union
(Information Society, Environment, Transport, CFDP, etc. but also external
relations) increasingly require space as an implementing tool, yet the
means and know-how rest mainly with ESA and national space bodies. The
need for a coherent European approach towards space is thus self-evident.
An EU/ESA policy should address all aspects (civilian and security) and
incorporate high level goals, basic guidelines for roles and responsibilities
of main European actors, and a European space programme as implementing
tool. The programme should cover the range of science, transportation
and applications activities but shift from a technology-driven to a user-driven
emphasis.
Mr Tytgat announced
the following steps in arriving at an EU/ESA policy: first, a Green Paper
for consultation by the end of 2002; second, preparation in 2003 of a
"White Paper" on the basis of the consultation process; third,
submission of the European Space Policy document to Council and Parliament;
and, fourth, submission of inputs to the Convention/IGC on treaty changes,
still in 2003. In the meantime, institutional
progress should be made through interaction between the first (Community)
and second (CFSP) pillar of the EU and ESA. As a transitional measure
a cooperative structure should be established between the European Community
and ESA under a simple, flexible Framework Agreement. For its part, the
EU Council should become engaged in the development of especially the
CFSP-related part of the policy. Integration of national programmes should
also figure in this scheme.
Dr
Ilana Bet-El,
Senior Policy Adviser at GPC International, spoke on "Getting the
Message Through: The dimension of strategic communication".
Dr Bet-El had been
invited as a non-space expert. For space policy is not only a matter of
decision, organization and space-related activity. It is also a matter
of communication, and strategic communication-her speciality-is of particular
importance given the reliance of space activities on political funding
and hence public support.
It is well known that European space efforts have not caught the public
eye sufficiently. She identified factors that could contribute to raising
the popularity of space with the public. Applying them would be aimed
at giving space a less "technological" and a more public-friendly
and appealing image. She pointed out that space can be fun and prestigious,
and can thus be brought closer to the public if effort is invested.
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She asked the participants
to stop being space professionals for a moment, and become ordinary citizens.
In their psychology, what is "space"? It is the realm of Star
Trek's Final Frontier, the scenes of exploration from 2001 Space Odyssey,
the Apollo Missions. These are cognitive concepts, and are not to be ignored
when trying to reach the public. These simple concepts in fact tell us
a lot. They imply a positive, forward-looking predisposition. But they
also recall Russian and particularly US activity, and an absence of "Europe".
It does not have the prominence to be recognized.
Is Europe therefore
condemned always to be an "also ran" in space? This depends
on why it wishes to invest in space.
Some things will work
with the public, and others not. If one takes-as elements of a future,
more ambitious space policy-the goals proposed by ESA's Long Term Space
Policy Committee of independence, planetary management, and using the
resources of space and exploring the Solar System, these are not antipathetic
goals, but they do pose challenges. The main challenge is "Europe"
itself. It must, to get broad support, at the same time show it is serious
about space, provide the "fun" element that appeals to the public,
and display coherence. Because Europe in general does not connect easily
with the public, it tends to work best in unseen areas. She then gave
some home truths about what can nevertheless attract Europeans. They approve
of Europe if it appears to contribute in "soft areas", by stimulating
the economic environment, taking action to improve the quality of life,
and engaging in research. They also like to feel independent of other
powers. And they are increasingly green. They will approve of planetary
management strategies. But they tend to disapprove if Europe goes into
hard areas like military activities. There is little pressure for Europe
to become a superpower.
The message that emerges to communicate space policy to the public is
therefore to stress economics, environmental concern, and research-and
to be sure to make it all exciting. This should be reinforced, however,
by relating new goals to Europe's track record, for example on sustainable
development. Europe should also be careful about vying for world domination.
It is far safer to emphasize the research and quality of life aspects.
And in doing so it is important not to leave space another "techie"
field. It must be presented in a manner accessible (and fun) for everyone,
and preferably as part of a world movement in which people in Europe are
participating. Done like this, Europe can begin to lead at the Final Frontier,
in its own way.
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What is surprising
is that already in 1988, in its first Communication on Space, the Commission
had called for coherence and indeed offered a plan to move forward decisively.
This did not occur. Instead a series of further discussion papers followed,
accompanied, it is true, by greater interaction between the Commission
and ESA. Recently, the institutions have appealed to outside advice-"Wise
Men" led by former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt (2000) and a
group of distinguished legal professors ("Legal Wise Men", 2001).
The Bildt report urged that ESA become the EU's space agency. The Legal
Wise Men advised that the choice was between "integration" of
ESA in the EU and a "cooperative/partnership" approach, the
former being a more lengthy undertaking than the former because it will
involve treaty changes.
Much could be done
under the cooperation/partnership model by defining specific policy areas
for each party. Yet it is ultimately a complex arrangement and does not
fully address the underlying policy difficulties that are becoming ever
more evident. Looking to the integrationist model, this offers in fact
more flexibility to ESA than might be supposed. There are already several
different models for agencies functioning within the EU "family".
What is required in this case above all is institutional creativity, because
ESA is clearly as special case. Applying such creativity depends on a
constructive, well informed, cooperative process, to which the workshop
series is intended to make the greatest contribution it can.
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